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The purpose of this study was to establish whether there are
differences between lay and scientist subjects in l) their evalua
tion of the scientificity of written messages with different kinds
of quantification and 2) in the categories or qualities which sub
jects generate to illustrate differences between scientific and
non-scientific communication. A subsidiary purpose was to dis
cover whether scientist and lay subjects' predispositions favorable
to solving a problem identified in a written message were influ
enced by the presence or absence of numbers.
The subject population consisted of forty-five lay and forty-five
scientist subjects who read a message about acid rain and responded
to a questionnaire, which included scaled items pertaining to the
scientificity of the message, the credibility of the message source,
the solvability of the problem, knowledge of rules for scientific
decisionmaking and willingness to share information. The question
naire also included one open-ended question pertaining to concepts
illustrative of differences between scientific and non-scientific
communication.
The largest source of significant differences in the study was
differences between lay and scientist subjects. Specifically,
scientists were more apt to l) disagree that the message was scien
tifically stated and to doubt the message source's credentials;
2) evaluate the irrelevant numbers message more negatively; 3) be
more confident in their knowledge of the rules for scientific
decisionmaking; *0 think that acid rain was a significant problem
and a solvable problem; 5) generate more concepts illustrative
of differences between scientific and non-scientific communication;
and 6) generate more words illustrative of the process of doing
science. In the latter case, lay subjects generated about equal
numbers of words illustrative of the process of doing science and
of the product or scientific message. For both subject populations,
however, science was regarded as "accurate, true, and right."
Other conclusions were that scales intended to measure scientificity
did intercorrelate highly and that quantification did not affect
perceptions of problem solvability, sourco credibility, and scientificity. Finally, there were no differences between scientist and
lay subjects on the willingness-to-share-information scale.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Scientific communication, and its role in the actual doing of
science, has been scrutinized by researchers and scholars in a variety
of disciplines.

Much effort has been devoted to attempts to discover

the nature of scientific

.knowledge.

Little effort has been devoted

to establishing categories or qualities which scientists and laypeople use to conceptualize science.

The specific purpose of this

study is to establish whether there are differences between lay and
scientist subjects in l) their reponse to different kinds of quantif
ication in written messages and 2) in the categories or qualities
which they generate to illustrate differences between scientific and
nonscientific communication.

A subsidiary purpose is to discover

whether scientist and lay subjects' predispositions toward solving a
problem identified in a written message are influenced by the presence
or absence of numbers.

This chapter contains a statement of the problem

and a statement of the research questions.
Statement of th^ Problem
Background: What is Science?
There is no consensus on the nature of science. What a physicist
does when she does science is different from what a sociologist does
when she does science.

In part, of course, the doing of science

in physics and sociology differ
different.

because the domain of inquiry is

In part, however, the doing of science in physics and

and sociology differ because different disciplines have different
ideas of science. To

take an example from one discipline, psych

ology, Fodor (1972) noted that the behaviorist idea of science had
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focused the discipline's practitioners on a domain of problems which
could only be legitimately addressed by "theories" which contained
the fewest possible non-observation,

terms and which explicitly opera-

tionalized the few such terms they did have.
of a discipline and its practitioners

In part then the behavior

exemplifies ideas and findings

about the behavior of scientists and the nature of science that the
discipline has developed (Merton, 1972).
There are, of course, those who contend that much, if not all,
of the social sciences are not science, but to enter the thickets of the
discussions on the question of the validity and nature of scientific
knowledge is not the purpose of the present study.
To emphasize this point, we could say that individuals, as well
as individual disciplines and professions, have an idea of what
constitutes an "acceptable scientific story."

Using the word "story"

rather than "message" is useful here in the sense that acceptable
story encompasses more substantive issues (like what constitutes
acceptable problem-solving methods) than does "acceptable message,"
which tends to encourage the reader to think along the lines of format
characteristics.

Further, "acceptable story" serves to remind the

reader that contemporary scholars do not view scientific knowledge
as, necessarily, scientific truth.
V/hat is of interest to the present study is the various dimensions
along which people and disciplines tend to view science and scientific
communication.

The following perspectjves are relevant to the present

study: l) the views of science that different scientists in different
disciplines adhere to and propound; 2) the views of science that are
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characteristic of so-called lay people; and 3) the views of science
emerging from the scholarship of those philosophers and historians of
science and socisil scientists who take the study of science as their
domain of inquiry.
Before examining those views, it would be useful to emphasize
the following point: Science is not a singular monolithic sort of
entity.

Rather than there being a science per se,

there is science-^,

science2» science^, only "various autonomous domains of inquiry
(which) develop epistemic criteria that often are widely divergent and
potentially conflicting" (Holzner and Marx, 1979» P- 212).

These

"autonomous domains" do not always, perhaps not even usually, get along.
As controversies between the disciplines which take science as their
domain of inquiry

suggest, there is a tendency to devalue the

scholarly output of other disciplines.

Even the mere sharing of

information with those outside the discipline is contrary to tradition
al professional roles and to the peer reward system (Lopata, 1976;
Pullen and Fraser, 1975)Grounded in the kind of science practiced by their individual,
disciplines, it is not surprising that scholars who study science
disagree over how (and by whom) science should be investigated.
Sociologists Holzner and Marx (1979), for example, are careful to
point out that their view differs significantly "from the treatment
of scientific disciplines and professions merely in terms of...map
ping communication links" which, they state, can make "important but
limited contributions" (p. 168).

Since much of psychologist Garvey's

work has been devoted to mapping those links, he doubtless would

disagree.

Philosopher Daudan (1977), on the other hand, castigates

the sociologists for using scientific arguments as data when they
have no understanding of what those arguments are about. Social scientists
are sometimes accused of "doing the history of science without a
license (Griffith, 1979, p- 383)* However, in response to the philos
ophers, information scientist Griffith

pleads with the philosophers

of science to look at the data.
Despite interdisciplinary

contentiousness, disciplines are

becoming increasingly homogenized by the tasks their practitioners
engage in.
back

a nd

Garvey (1979) speaks of the research scientist who flits

forth between basic research and

technology.

Holzner and

Marx (1979) note that
There is some evidence...various activities...largely in
dependent of each other are coming into closer... communi
cation with each other. As a result, it is often difficult
to distinguish between activities labeled basic research,
applied research, technology, and production/utilization
(p. 31).
Perhaps more importantly, however, scientist/professionals are
united by
an aim toward...a standard of scientificity, the principles
of w^ich are believed to be universal....the frames of
reference, reality tests, and rules for evidence from...
divergent fields are reasonably systematic, describable and
embedded in a broader scientific conception of truth which
does enable them to be translated into each other....a
broad conception of science serves as an ideal standard
of truth (p. 212).
Put another way, the divergent disciplines are united by the fact that
they have epistemic criteria.
From

Holzner and Marx's social construction of reality per

spective, epistemic criteria also function to establish a common frame
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of reference, which provides all practitioners with a consensually
validated perspective for the doing of science.

That intradisciplin-

ary communication systems are jealously guarded closed systems would
tend to reinforce the discipline's epistemic criteria and its idea
of a good science story—as well as make it stronger than that for
laypersons.
This is not, of course, to say that there is total consensus within
disciplines.

Psychologist Harlow, for example, said that the behavior-

ist notion of science had focused researchers on a set of problems the
importance of which had "decreased as a negatively accelerated function
approaching an asymtote of complete indifference."

A discipline then

is a fuzzy-edged group of individuals united by both a more-or-less
common domain of inquiry and a more-or-less common idea about proper
scientific procedures.
But practicing scientists are not the only ones with ideas about
the nature of science.
stories.

Laypeople, too, have ideas of good science

Kuhn (1961) argues that both laypeople (and would-be

scientists) gain their first and sometimes last exposure to science
through textbooks.

Since texts are designed to propagate the current

truths of a discipline and are ahistorical, they do not give their
readers an idea of how science is actually done, how scientific
progress is achieved.

"There is a textbook image of science,"

Kuhn observed, "and it may be systematically misleading" (1961, p.
162).

Textbooks' disregard for refute^ theory, coupled with their

tendency to include only those numerical tobies that confirm the theory
the text is advancing, might be responsible for the common equation
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of scientific knowledge with scientific truth.
conception is common.

Certainly, such a mis

So is the view that "science produces technology

which, in turn produces wars, pollution

and stimulates the wealthy,

the western and the capitalistic to live beyond the world's means"
(Griffith, 1979» PP« 382-83).

The remainder of this section will

examine some of the views of science advanced by the disciplines who
study herPhilosophy and History of Science Perspective
Views of science advanced by historians and philosophers of
science are particularly germane to the present study because of the
seemingly widespread diffusion of a particular philosophy of science,
logical positivism/empiricism.

In

response, for example, to what he

regarded as problematic in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum
physics, Feyerabend wrote
that the fight for tolerance in scientific matters and the
fight for scientific progress must still be carried on.
What has changed is the denominations of the enemies....
Today they call themselves...logical empiricists(1963»p»5)•
Whatever the implications for the growth of knowledge, the logical
empiricist view of science does seem a common one, in the social as
well as the physical sciences.

In psychology, for example, the logical

empiricist view of science was "imported, with undisguised gratitude,
from the philosophy of science...some three decades ago...Psychology
is thus in the unenviable position of standing on philosophical founda
tions which began to be vacated by philosophy almost as soon as the
former had borrowed them "(Koch, 196^, p. 5).

And there are sociologists

who regard themselves as social or billiard ball physicists.
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Two characteristics of the logical empiricist tradition seem
worth emphasizing.

First, these empiricists were ahistorical in their

approach to science.

Their pronouncements were not based on descrip

tions of how science was practiced in the

world. Rather, their aim

was to establish deductive certainty for empirical knowledge.

Second,

the empiricists were almost exclusively concerned with establishing
scientific progress as a logical (in the formal sense of that word)
endeavor whose conclusions were certainti.es.

Scientific knowledge

was absolutely grounded in the, as it were, bedrock of experience.
Characteristically, the logical empiricists believed both in the
possibility of the logical reconstruction of scientific discovery and
theory change and in explicitly and logically defining theoretical
terms.
Although the logical empiricists claimed to have established
this logical basis for science, a gradually increasing pattern of
anomalies led to consensus on its sterility amongst philosophers of
science, although not amongst the general public and many practicing
scientists, as the examples from psychology and physics illustrate.
Some anomalies resulted from the empiricist assertion that theoretical
terms could be precisely defined.
terms (including

H ussell'fi

Attempts to define theoretical

explicit definitions, Bridgeman's opera

tional definitions, and ^arnap's reduction sentences and correspondence
rules) failed.

Craig's and Wi nn i e 's theorems in mathematics, which

convinced the empiricists that for any theory

consisting solely

of theoretical and observational terms you could both eliminate the
theoretical terms and change their meanings without changing the validity
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of the theory,were a

further embarasscent.

Other anomalies, which

stemmed from the empiricists' misplaced faith in the non-modal symbolic
logic of IVincipia Mathematica, included being able to confirm a
theory like "all ravens are black" with an observation; like "seeing
a yellow pencil."

In retrospect, the empiricists' attempts to make

science logical were either too rigid, gutting science's ability to
predict and generalize, or too loose, allowing nonsense statements
into the corpus of scientific knowledge.
To overcome the problem of confirmation via induction, which the
empiricists asserted they had solved but never did, Sir Karl Popper,
in his early writings, contended that if we could not confirm theories,
then we could at least falsify or disconfirm them.
that if a given theory predicts

Popper reasoned

a certain observational consequence,

failure to obtain that consequence would disconfirm or falsify the
theory via the modus tollens principle of deductive logic.
Here then was certainty for science.

Duhem and Quine, however,

pointed out that theories are always tested in conjunction with
numerous background

a ssumptions

(e.g., about the efficacy of a par

ticular operational definition).

We could, of course, have good

inductive reasons to assume that background assumptions were not
responsible for the observational consequence—but that lets "whiffs
of induction" into Popper's model.

Since theories or hypotheses

obtained inductively are uncertain, scientific knowledge is left
foundationless.
It was the empiricists' inability to solve the problem of induction
that led Popper, and others, to conclude that scientific knowledge is
foundationless.

As a foil to the widely diffused empiricist model of
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science, it would be useful to examine ideas of science developed in
the contemporary history and philosophy of science. Witchcraft, said
Feyerabend, is as grounded in experience as is physics (1963), an
assertion all the more disturbing in that physics seems to be everyone's
paradigm of science.

Perception is theory laden, argued Norwood Hanson:

observation and empirical statements, like a meter, respond to the
world, but how they are interpreted depends on the meter readerAlthough the debate over the certainty of scientific knowledge is far
from over, there is now more emphasis en describing the doing of science
than on logically reconstructing it.

Hie logical empiricists were

ahistorical, but the contemporary philosophy of science is not.
Kuhn (1970), whose views are representative of the newer school
in the history and philosophy of science, argued that the old empiricist
tradition was not supported by the record from the history of science,
particularly physics, which seems the only discipline intensively
studied by philosophers and historians of science.

In Kuhn's view,

science—at least in paradigmed disciplines like physics—progresses
not steadily but through alternating cycles
science.

of normal and revolutionary

formal science is a problem- or puzzle-solving activity and,

as such, guarantees thab an answer is available,restricts methods for
answering, and specifies what constitutes acceptable solutions.
During periods of normal science, the theories are extended and made
more

precise, undetermined facts are discovered, and the paradigm

itself is articulated, its ambiguities increasingly resolved and its
applications extended.

When science erters a crisis period, what is

challenged is its mode of adjudication.

There are no formulas to tell

when to give up a theory or paradigm. An emerging—and sustained—
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pattern of anomalies or instances where observational outcomes are
not in accord with theoretical predictions triggers theoretical
and paradigm change in science.

Although some critics have accused

Kuhn of taking the view that theory change in science is totally a
function of mob psychology, without benefit of any rules for adjud
ication, they are in the minority-

Science is more commonly regarded

as at least a rational enterprise.
Disciplines have paradigms which more-or-less articulate the
discipline's ideas about science.(Social sciences can also be thought
to have paradigms, albeit very diluted and diffused ones.)

The

notion of "paradigm" is not, however, clearly defined in Kuhn. One
critic, for example, pointed out that Kuhn used "paradigm" twelve
different ways in the Structures.
Still, from the overall Kuhnian perspective, an emergent view
is that the discipline's stories influence what and how the discipline
researches.

Within this process view, logical empiricism could

be cast as an example of a specific kind of story, one which is still
prevalent amongst scientists and, consequently, exerts some influence
on the doing of contemporary science.

Whether such science stories

introduce rigor and serve to advance scientific knowledge or whether,
as Feyerabend (19&3) argued, they are dogmatic metaphysical systems
whose adoption imperils the growth of knowledge, is another issue.
Social Scientific Perspective
Instead of focusing on nonobservable stories or paradigms, the
majority of social scientists who study science focus primarily on
observables.

In addition to its being a knowledge-producing activity, science is
also a social activity. "Science," wrote sociologist Zuckerman, "is
not well organized or well articulated. People are jealous and do not
necessarily get along with one another. To expect anything other than this
is to be uncritically optimistic"(l970»P-3l)•Another factor contributing
to the relativity of scientific knowledge is the lack of mechanical pro
cedures for applying criteria for adjudication to specific problems. In
one empirical study of referee behavior, pscyhologist

Garvey (1979) found

that while referees showed a great deal of agreement as to what good
scientific articles should be like, they showed only chance-level agreement
when it came to assessing the merits of individual articles.

The rela

tivity of knowledge is also indicated by information science studies of
citation behavior, which indicate, for example, that journal articles have
a useful "half life" during which time they are cited and after which they
are forgotten.

Ait to describe the essence of a domain on inquiry as

"relative" is not sufficient.
Communication, scholars like

Garvey, Meadows(197*+) > and Ziman(l968)

argue, is the essence of contemporary science. Certainly, when speaking
of science and scientific communication, it is necessary to distinguish past
from present. Holzner and Marx (1979) link the origins of science with
"cultural free spaces," in which otherwise effective restraints and author
itative strictures are at least partially suspended.

Now, however, scholars

like Feyerabend (1963) argue that science (at least the Copenhagen inter
pretation of quantum physics) is on its way to becoming what, it ostensibly
abhors, a dogmatic metaphysical system.

Whatever the implications for

the growth of knowledge, science's transformation from a cottage
industry to a social activity has increasing

meant

that

its

infor
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mation is public information (Ziman,

1968).

Publication is the

way to establish priority of discovery—which is the route to reward,
to success within the discipline—and to disseminate and have verified
one's discoveries.
Communication has always been an important part of science.
for example,

In 1610,

Galileo wrote ^epler a letter which contained the following

anagram: smaismrmilmepoetalevmibunenugttaviras, which, unscrambled, said
altissimum pal entam tergeminum observari, and, translated

said,"I have

seen the uppermost planet triple," referring, of course, t-'o Galileo's
discovery of Saturn's rings (Meadows, 197^)•

Contemporary scientists

use the more-efficient journals rather than obscure anagrams to establish
priorities. The communication channels in science have evolved to better
meet scientist's needs and the increasingly interactive nature of science
(Garvey, 1979).
Despite cross-disciplinary differences in scientists' problem-solving
criteria, scientists in all disciplines exhibit many

similar communication

behaviors. For one thing, they are resistant to attempts to change their
closed system of communication. Velikovsky's ideas, for example, were
presented outside the formal communication system, and so many scientists
condemmed them on an a. priori basis, without even reading his books.
Journal publication, which represents a method of storytelling to
which most laypeople are never exposed,is of central importance in a
discipline's formal communication network. Of course, on the research
front of a discipline, interpersonal communication is a more important
source of relevant information: by the time articles are printed in
journals, the research front is addressing different problems.

And
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at the early stages of problem solution, when critical feedback on
design and research questions is important, the informal or inter
personal

networks are crucial.

Another indicator of the importance of communication to science is
c.ensorship incidents.
example.

«^e need not turn as far back as Galileo for an

When he was editor of the only specialized statistical

journal at the time,

Pearson regularly refused to publish articles

written by Fisher, whose philosophy of statistics differed from his
own (Meadows, 197^).

And there is the apocryphal tale of rationalist

Noam Chomskey's threatening to resign if the behaviorally oriented
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Eehavior

persisted in its

refusal to publish Fodor's article attacking (and some would say
demolishing) O.H. Mowrer's behavioral language-acquisition theory.
Soviet biologist Lysenko went further than 'suppressing publication
of dissident articles in the journal which he edited: he had the
leaders of the opposition arrested.
Communication is also essential in the process whereby individual
practitioners in a discipline learn those ideas about the behavior of
science and scientists that have been developed by the discipline,
would-be scientists learn about their disciplines by learning how their
disciplines communicate, and it is upon the discipline's communication
system that the would-be scientist's subsequent survival depends
(Garvey, 1979)In part, of course, students learn about specific facts and
theories, about the current accomplishments and achievements of their
discipline.

But they also learn met^ ideas like what their disciplines

conceive of

as

interesting problems and acceptable means of solution.

In the terminology of this inquiry, they learn the ingredients of
what their disciplines consider to be good science stories.
Much of this latter kind of knowledge Kuhn (1970) calls "tacit
knowledge."

These unwritten behavioral norms are learned by example

or by exemplars, not by rules.

Other scholars would call this process

socialization.
However
disciplines.

they learn, would be scientists learn the norms of their
Merton (1957)

delineated the four central institu

tional imperatives of science as universalism (objective and impersonal
canons of truth), communism (public information), disinterestedness
(subordination of individual motives to institutional norms), and
organized skepticism (continous scrutiny of assertions in terms of
logical or empirical criteria).

Cooperation within disciplines seems

more the norm than cooperation between disciplines.

Other norms,

identified by Chase,(1978) are pertinence to current research, logical
rigor, precision, theoretical significance, and the use of mathematics.
Given the view of scientific knowledge as factual knowledge, it would
seem reasonable to add precise, logical, objective

and causality as

additional characterisitcs of "good" science stories.
Measurement and duantification as Norm^ in Science
Certainly, we have seen that disciplines have a variety of norms
or tacit rules that pertain to their ideas of good science stories.
One apparently interdisciplinary norm seems to be using measurement
(using procedures that always produce actual numbers).

The operational

indicator of the hardness—and thus the prestige—of a discipline is
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the extent to which it uses mathematics (Chase, 1978).
Numbers—what Storer called "the superficial trappings of quanti
fication" (I970i P- 132)—certainly abound in journal articles. There
are, not surprisingly, some cross-disciplinary differences.

Meadows

(1978), for example, noted that while social science journals have
fewer numerical results than do physical science journals, they
nevertheless have almost as many experimentally controlled numbers.
To take an example from another discipline, one of the issues
raised in communication journal articles questioning the assumptions
of the field pertains to the role of measurement. Fisher (1977) noted
that "to require that all research evidence be composed of numbers and all
analyses be statistical is no more valid than to require a rule-conforming
theory" (p. l8).

Delia and Grossberg(1977) also observed that all too

often communication theories reflect researchers' mathematical assumptions
more than the meaningfulness of the social world.
that while

^ehrabian intended

Scheidel (1977) noted

some qualification of his .07-.38-.55

formula (which predicts the amount of

liking that is attributable to

verbal, vocal, and facial codes), "bald faced citations" of the formula
are common in the literature, thereby giving the formula
than is warranted. Scheidel attributed this kind of

more precision

blindness to

accepting, without question, the assertions of authorities. An alternative
explanation would be that the numbers themselves lend an aura of precision.
It would almost seem that the practical meaning for social scientists
of Lord K e ivin s famous dictum—"If you cannot measure, your knowledge is
meager and unsatisfactory"—is that suggested by Kuhn (l96l):"lf you
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cannot measure, measure anyhow."

This is not,

of course, to say

that social science journals contain useless numbers but physical science
journals do not.

Writing about a literature search aimed at extracting

a data base of interatomic energy functions, Boyle et al. (1977, cited
by Meadows, 1978, p. 51) wrote,

"To our surprise we found that, in more

than 80?o of the cases, those who have published potential data have
failed to provide estimates of the accuracy....Thus, often the published
data is (sic) worthless."
Some scholars have speculated on possible reasons for the preval
ence of useless numbers.

Kuhn (1961), for example, pointed out

that measurement has not been the route to success in the physical
sciences, although textbooks give the mistaken notion that measuring is
the route to success.

Kuhn argues that numerical tables in text

books are useful only insofar as they provide an exemplar for
"reasonable agreement" between theoretical prediction and observational
outcomes:
Scientific practice exhibits no consistently applied or consis
tently applicable external criterion. "Reasonable agreement"
varies from one part of science to another, and within any part of
science it varies with time. What to Ptolemy and his immediate
successors was reasonable agreement between astronomical theory and
observation was to ^opernicus incisive evidence that the Ptolemaic
system must be wrong. Between the times of °avendish (1731-1810)
and ^amsay (1852-1916), a similar change in accepted chemical
criteria for "reasonable agreement" led to the study of the noble
gases. hese divergences are typical and they are matched by those
between contemporary branches of the scientific community. In parts
of spectroscopy "reasonable agreement" means agreement in the
first six or eight left-hand digits in the numbers of a table of
wave lengths. In the theory of solids, by contrast, two-place
agreement is often considered very good indeed. Yet there are
certain parts of astronomy in which any search for even so limited
an agreement must seem Utopian. In the theoretical study of stellar
magnitudes, agreement to a multiplicative factor of ten is often
taken to be "reasonable" (p. 166).
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Kuhn argued that numerical tables in textbooks are useful solely for the
purpose of determining "reasonable agreement," because they record the
outcomes of specific discovery and confirmation procedures

and because

"the route from theory or law to measurement can almost never be travelled
backwards" (p. 175)• Kuhn cautioned would-be scientists and philosophers
that texts may be the right place for philosophers to discover
the logical structure of finished scientific theories, they are
more likely to mislead than to help the unwary individual who
asks about productive methods....texts teach how to read lit
erature, not how to create or evaluate it. What signposts they
supply to these latter points are most likely to point in the
wrong direction (p. 167).
Productive methods, Kuhn argued, are almost always initially qualitative.
Without this necessary initial qualitative work, "numbers gathered without
some knowledge of the regularity to be expected almost never speak for
themselves. Almost certainly they remain just numbers" (p. 175)Although K u hn noted that the signposts supplied in the textbooks
"point in the wrong direction," the journal articles seem to do no better.
Weigert (1970) argued that sociologists use statistical tests in a ritual
manner in order to get their articles past the gatekeepers or journal
referees. Storer speculated that the prevalence of numbers "rray stem
partly from the desire to emulate the harder, more established disciplines
(1970, p.132 ).

Other writers have attributed this condition to the

worship of statistics:
Scientific method has been to develop methods of defining external
criteria which transcend individual judgment alone and which can
be applied to a variety of factual difficulties. The contemporary
biomedical and behavior scientist is like a skilled lawyer in
a j^y
peers, searching out acceptable ways to obtain and
evaluate the suitability and respectability of evidence. The rules
of evidence are random selection of subjects, the use of control
groups, large sample si^es, operational definition of variables,
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and statistical analysis of the data. The desire to achieve
"objective evidence" has sprung so loose from its roots that this
last component has come to supercede and overshadow all the
various rules of evidence, acting on its own as a court of final
and complete appeal. After all, what could be more objective
than a set of numbers? (Schulman, Kupst, and Suran, 1977i P-39).
Since science wants only to acquire clean, clear ideas, numbers are par
ticularly prized.
To summarize, K u hn's history of science approach argued that for the
physical sciences, measuring was not the route to progress. W e
this to be true of the social sciences as well.

Can

assume

However, in both the

physical and the social sciences, other researchers indicate that journal
articles are peppered with numbers, some of them useless. Kuhn argued that
textbooks mislead philosophers of science about the function of measure
ment. ^t would seem that they have also misled scientists. Kuhn
was incorrect when stating that journals show the real and useful function
of measurement in science.
The numbers in the journals may, however, say something about science
in the world, about how science is done—or about norms for scientific
stories.
The following question then arises: Are scientific messages somehow
perceived as more scientific, as telling a better science story, when they
have numbers in them? This question could be asked of lay as well as
scientific populations. N 0 one has asked it of either.
Experimental Studies on the Effects of Measurement
For lay populations, messages with numbers in them (on general
topics like capital punishment, legalized gambling, and school boards)
have been shown to increase attitude change and source credibility.
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Messages with numbers (on scientific topics) have also, for lay subjects,
been shown to increase reading time and to decrease comprehension (although
these results were not significant), and to decrease predisposition to
solving problems.
That part of the attitude change literature concerned with evidence
usage indicates that messages with numerals educe significantly more attitude
change than do messages without them.

In all the studies cited in this

section, messages with evidence were operationalized as messages with
numbers.

The following operational

definitions °f the levels of evidence

employed by Kline (197*0 are illustrative:
Specific evidence: Of the college freshmen who rank in the bottom
half on entrance examinations, only 35^ will make it through the
entire four years. However, of those in the top half of the enter
ing freshman classes, 85/° will graduate from college.
Nonspecific evidence: Of the college freshmen who rank low on
entrance examinations, many will not make it through the entire
four years. However, of those who rank high the greatest share
will graduate from college.
No evidence* It appears that students who rank low in the entering
freshmen classes do not stand as good a chance to make it through
the entire four years as those who rank high (p. ^+08).
In. a situation where subjects were asked to express their degree of
agreement or of disagreement to written messages on different topics
(legalized gambling, admissions requirements, and accelerated programs),
Kline found that subjects reading messages with numbers (specific evidence)
changed opinion significantly more in the direction advocated by the message
than did subjects who read messages without numbers (nonspecific
evidence).

and no

The only exception occurred for low intelligence subjects

reading messages on statements of fact: while not showing significant
differences, such subjects did favor messages with numbers. Further, for
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both kinds of messages, expertness and trustworthiness scores of the
unidentified messages writers varied in the same direction that type of
evidence varied.
McCroskey's (1967) operationalization of evidence (in messages about
capital punishment and school boards) was similar to Kline's: "23.8/6
of the nation's school boards include people who are not even high school
graduates" was generalized to "many school boards in the United States
include people who are not even high school graduates" (pp. 191-92). Unlike
Kline, however, McCroskey's numbered messages also contained source attributions
and their qualifications.

McCroskey found that messages with numbers were

significantly more effective in producing attitude shifts than those
which included no numbers.
scores on authoritativeness

McCroskey also found that significantly higher
resulted from the numbered

messages and that

the "caliber of evidence" was also rated significantly higher.

While McCroskey

did not include intelligence as a variable, he did find that GPA did not
correlate significantly with his dependent variables.
To extend the attitude-change literature to counterpersuasion,
McCroskey (1970) operationalized evidence in the same way he had in
preceding studies, with "56^" being substituted for "a majority."
This study showed both a significant interaction between credibility and
messages with numbers and, further, that numbered messages tended to
serve as inhibitors of counterpersuasion.

McCroskey and Dunham (1966)

also reported an interaction between messages with numbers and initial
credibility, with the numbered messages being significantly more
effective under conditions of low credibility.
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Finally, of particular relevance to the present study is a study
which investigated the effect of quantification (measurement) on
predispositions
(Witt, 1976).

about solving problems posed in a 200-word message

In this study, Witt controlled readability and varied

quantification in written messages presented to university students.
Subjects received one of two messages, one containing twelve quantifiers
(e.g., "80% nitrogen") and the other containing
tifiers (e.g., "mostly nitrogen").
used

twelve pseudo quan

For a dependent measure, Witt

a list of 30 favorable, unfavorable, and neutral words randomly

arranged.

Predisposition favorable to finding

the frequency of favorable words selected.

solution was measured by

Using mean number of

favorable words selected, Witt found that quantification (measurement)
significantly reduced favorability.

Perhaps, he speculated, because

it gave subjects too much information.

It is not clear, however,

whether Witt's results reflect an effect for relevant measurement
or for mere measurement.

Also, looking at only favorable scales is a

minor methodological problem.

Testing only lay subjects has further

limited the generality of Witt's study.
In summary then, numbers are seen to be an important message
variable in scientific journal writing.

r ^he

history of science

indicates that numbers have not furthered scientific progress in the
long run; current-day scholars in a variety of disciplines indicate
this is also true for current problem-solving activities.

Kuhn's

notion of exemplars provides something to an answer to "why numbers?"
Certainly, for contemporary scientists, journals reinforce the associa
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tion of numbers with science; they themselves can be thought of as
exemplars, as models of scientific communication.

Numbers also

increased attitude change, source credibility and decreased predis
position to solving problems for lay subjects.

Whether these effects

stem from the mere presence of the numbers or are associated with
the

specificity of the evidence is not, however, clear.

Nor is it

clear whether these effects are limited to lay populations.
Research Questions
The present study is intended to remedy the following two short
comings identified in the literature; l) Whether it is the mere
presence of numbers that makes messages seem more scientific and
decreases predisposition to finding solutions. 2) Whether scientists
and lay subjects differ in their respo^ijes to quantification and
whether they conceptualize science differently.

Further, unlike most

studies on scientific communication (Hiltz, 1978), it will be
experimental rather than correlational.
In the present study, the experimental variable will be three
messages that are identical except in the method of quantification
employed: one will have no numbers; a second will have numbers that
are relevant to the issue; and a third will contain useless numbers
that contribute nothing

to the understanding of the problem.

second or correlational

variable in the present study will be the

comparison of lay and scientist subjects.

The

One of the dependent measures

in the present study will test whether messages with numbers are per
ceived as more scientific by both lay and scientist subjects.

'•'•he
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other dependent measure—the JP favorable, unfavorable, and neutral
words used by Wj_tt—will test predisposition to finding solution for both
lay and scientist subjects.
The qualitative portion of the study will examine those categories
which lay and scientist subjects seem to use to conceptualize science
and scientific communication.
It is hypothesized that
1) Scientist and lay subjects will perceive messages with numbers
as havinr greater scientificity than messages without numbers.

Messages

with numbers will be perceived as more precise, more logical, more
scientific, more explanatory, more objective, as containing more as
well as more relevant evidence, as well as establishing a causal link
and containing technical-journal like evidence.

Given the prevalence

of useless numbers in scientific writing, this hypothesis will probably
be true

for both relevant and irrelevant numbers.

2) Message version will affect lay

<-md

scientist snb.jects* predisposition

favorable to findin/r solution. Certainly, Witt's study indicates that
for lay subjects, measurement decreases favorable predisposition.
For scientist subjects, however, one might expect the opposite, given
the prevalence of numbers in scientific communication.
3) Subjects' perceptions of the authoritativeness of the message
source will be affected by the presence or absence of numbers in the
messages but their perceptions of the trustworthiness of the message
source will not be so affected.
k) Scientist subjects will have stronger opinions about science
than will lay subjects.

Scientists will both feel more confident in
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their knowledge of scientific decision making than will lay subjects,
and they will generate more words illustrative of differences between
scientific and nonscientific communication than will lay subjects.
5) Scientist subjects will be less willing to disseminate infor
mation than will lay subjects.

Social science research indicates that

while communication within the discipline is essential to the doing of
science, communication outside the discipline is regarded as either
unimportant or as a violation of disciplinary standards.
Definitions
"Levels of measurement":

The relevant numbers message version will

contain numbers with some bearing on the problem while the irrelevant
numbers version will contain numbers %ith no bearing on the problem.
The no numbers message version will, o/ course, have no numbers.

The

relevant numbers version will be operationalized by statements like
"Some rainfall has a pH as low as 3*0i about that of lemon juice" while
the other messages will contain statements like, "Some rainfall has a
pH as low

as

lemon juice."

The irrelevant numbers version will be

operationalized by statements like "Eastern 1/2 of the United States...."
while the other message versions will contain statements like
"Eastern part of the United States...."
"Scientist" will, for the present study, be taken to include both
basic research scientists as well as professionals in engineering.
"Predisposition toward solution": As mentioned previously, it
is not clear whether Witt's differences did in fact reflect jxredisposition favorable to finding solution.
the same 30 words will be used.

To replicate the Witt study,

In addition, two qualitative questions

will be asked to help determine what is being measured, whether it is
perceived problem solvability or perceived problem complexity.

CHAPTER II
METHOD
Subjects
Subjects included b^> professionals in scientific fields (scientists)
and a comparison group of b^> laypersons (nonsc'.entists).

Scientist

subjects were recruited from professionals working for the U.S.
Geological Survey and from the Idaho Nuclear Engineering Laboratory.
Lay subjects were sampled from introductory courses in Interpersonal
Communication.

Potential subjects were

approached by the researcher's

confederates, told about the study, what their role would consist of
should they choose to participate, and asked if they would be willing
to participate.

Demographic data are summarized in Appendix B.
Materials

Three versions of a 200-word science message (one without numbers,
one with twelve irrelevant numbers, and one with twelve relevant
numbers) were developed from an environmental impact analysis of the
problem of acid rain.
The dependent variable consisted of sets of scales following the
message.

They included a set of agree-disagree scales intended to

measure message scientificity,

the 30 words used by Witt to measure

predisposition toward solving the problems presented in the message,
one open-ended qualitative question that pertained to subjects' per
ceptions of science, and a set of demographic questions.
A message on an environmental issue was selected partly to
extend the generality of Witt's study ar>i partly to allow the resecU'eher
to generalize to environmental problems.
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Acid rain was selected as
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the specific message topic, because it is a contemporary issue but
is not as controversial as, say, the nuclear power question.

Further,

this topic was one that was amenable to all three message versions.
Procedure
Messages and scales were prepared in booklet form.

Booklets

were randomized and then distributed to subjects by the researcher's
confederates on a first-come first-serve basis.

To eliminate the

threat of history to the design's internal validity, data collection
was coordinated in time among all subjects as much as possible.
Statistics
Hypotheses were tested using a 2 by 3 randomized block design
(13 subjects/cell).

The independent variables were the threee

different message types and the two kinds of subjects, scientist
and layFor hypothesis one, which pertained to perceived scientificity,
a two-way analysis of variance between lay and scientist subjects and
between the three different message versions was computed on the
nine

scaled dependent measures: precision of problem statement,

adequacy of factual ovidence, logicalness of problem statement,
whether the message explains the problem,

whether it contains technical-

journal like evidence, whether the message states the problem objec
tively, whether it establishes a causal link, whether its presents
relevant evidence, and whether it states the problem in a scientific
way.
For hypothesis two, which pertained to perceived problem
solvability, the researcher, like Witt,

computed the mean number of
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favorable responses selected from Witt's initial

words/condition

and then computed a two-way analysis of variance between subjects and
between message versions.

To control for errors introduced by

variations in the amount of words subjects tend to underline, the
researcher also computed the ratio of favorable/unfavorable responses/
message version or condition and then computed a two-way analysis
of variance between subjects and message versions.
For hypothesis three, which pertained to perceptions of credi
bility, the researcher computed a two-way analysis of

variance

between subjects and message versions for the two scaled statements
on the authoritativeness and trustworthiness of the message source.
For hypothesis four, which pertained to knowledge of scientific
procedures,

the researcher computed a- two -way analysis of variance

between subjects for the scaled items on knowledge of the rules for
scientific decision making and for the number of concepts listed
in response to the open-ended qualitative question.
For hypothesis five, which pertained to willingness to share
information, the researcher computed a two-way anaJysis of variance
between subjects for the scaled item pertaining to willingness to
share information with those outside your discipline.
Two judges familiar with qualitative methodology inductively
determined categories for the open-ended qualitative question. After
completion of this task, the Cohen Coefficient of Agreement was com
puted as a measure of inter-judge reliability.

CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Results of the statistical analysis
experiment are presented in this chapter-

the data collected in the
-'•he analyses included a

two-way analysis of variance (between lay versus scientist subjects and
between the three message versions) for the scales used to indicate
perceived scientificity; for the words and scales used to indicate
perceived problem solvability; for the scales used to determine the
credibility of the message source; for the scales used to assess
knowledge of scientific decision making and the number of concepts
generated to illustrate scientific communication; and for the scale
used to determine willingness to share information.
Perceived Scientificity
The results of the analysis of variance of the nine dependent
measures designed to measure scientificity showed significant main
effects(without interactions) between lay and scientist subjects
along the following qualities: adequacy of evidence (F^ g^= 5«01; p <.05),
scientif icness of problem statement (F^ g^=l8.97i P<«05), and
whether it contained technical-journal like evidence (F^ g^=l8.02;p <.0^).
As shown in Table 2, the lay subjects tended to have no opinion
about the amount of evidence and to disagree somewhat about the
scientificness of the problem statement.

Along both categories,

the scientists tended to disagree: the message did not contain enough
evidence and it did not state the problem very scientifically.
As shown in Table 3, significant differences between belief in the
scientif icness of the problem statement and whether it contained
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technical-journal like evidence explained about 15 percent of the
2
variance (Eta = .15) whereas differences between lay and scientist
subjects' opinions about the adequacy of the evidence only accounted
2
for 5 percent of the variance (Eta =.05).
Results of the analysis of variance indicated only one signif
icant main effect among the nine dependent measures for message type.
That is, the subjects exposed tc the various message types differed in
opinion about whether the message contained technical-journal like
evidence (F^ g^=4.6^; p <.05). Scheffe

contrasts revealed that the

only significant difference here was between the relevant numbers and
the other two versions of the message, with all subjects agreeing
significantly more that the relevant numbers message was more like
a technical-journal article than the other message versions.

However,

as Table 3 shows, this difference only explained. .3 percent of the
2
variance in the experiment (Eta =.03).
Results of the analysis of variance of the nine dependent scales
indicate

significant disordinal interactions for the following

qualities: precision (F^ £^=3.19; p<.05), explanation (F^ ^=6.J>b;
p<.05), and causality (F^ g^=3.72; p<.05).

Scheffe Critical

Differences, listed in Table 2, show that for all three qualities,
the interaction is attributable solely to differential responses
to the irrelevant numbers version of the message.

Lay subjects tended

to have no opinion about the precision of the message and whether it
explained the problem but tended to agree that it did establish a
causal link.
message.

Scientists disagreed wvth all three statements about the

Uiat is, they did not think tn^ message very precise, did
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not think that it explained the problem, and did not think it established
a causal link.

These interactions, shown in Figure 1, mean, that

the main effects for precision and causality cannot be discussed.
No significant

main effects or interactions were found between

ratings of the following characteristics: logicality, relevance of
evidence, and objectivity.
Perceived Problem Solvability
Results of the analysis of variance

of the four dependent

rreasures that pertained to perceived problem solvability showed
significant differences only on the scaled ratings of the
solvability of the problem(F^ g^=11.77> p<.05).

As shown in Table

2 scientists thought the problem was mor<_ solvable than did the lay
subjects.

Since this is a main effect, it cannot, of course, be

attributed to the message versions.

It is interesting to note

that scientists were also significantly more sure that acid rain
was a problem (F^ g^=3^«02; p <.05) than were lay subjects.

This

difference explained almost 30 percent of the variance in the scale
ratings (Eta^=-.28).
Results were insignificant for both the number of favorable
words selected and the ratio of favorable to unfavorable words
selected.

In other words, Witt's study was not replicated.

Perceived Credibility of the Message Source
Results of the analysis of variance of the two scaled statements
about the authoritativeness and trustworthiness of the message source
were significant(F^ g^=9.73; p < .05 and F 1 g^=8.27; p<.05). Again,
these were simple main effects between scientist and lay subjects, with
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the scientists tending to doubt the credibility of the message source
more than did lay subjects.

As shown in Table 3» these significant

differences both explain about 10 percent of the variance in the
2
respective scale ratings (Eta =.10 and .0C).
Confidence in Knowledge of Scientific Decisionmaking
Results of the analysis of variance of the three dependent measures
(two scaled questions and the number of concepts generated to illustrate
differences between scientific and nonscientific communication)
showed significant differences as follows: for knowing the rules
for scientific decisionmaking (F^ g^=33*75; p<«05); for knowing
them because applying them is part of my current job (F^ g^=20.03;
p <.05); and for number of concepts generated (F^ g J i + =5»08; p<.05).
For the scaled questions pertaining to knowledge of procedures, lay
subjects tended to disagree that they knew the rules whereas scientist
subjects tended to agree that they know the rules but to have
no opinion about whether the only reason they knew them was because it
was part of their job.

Scientists subjects generated significantly

more concepts descriptive of scientific communication than did lay
subjects.

As shown in Table 3i the ,ercent of variance explained

for the knowing-the-rules question was aLout

percent (Eta "=.28);

for the knowing-the-rules-because-it-is- v ~rt-of-my —job question, it
p
was about 20 percent (Eta "=.19); and for the number of concepts

2

generated, it was less than 10 percent ( i -ita =.06).
Willingness to Share Information
Results of the analysis of variance to test whether scientist
subjects were le..s willing to share information were insignificant.
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TABLE 1

Analysis of Variance of Ratings of the Three Message Versions on each
of the Dependent Measure Scales

Scale

Source

SS

df

MS

F

1
2
2
8*+

15..21
1 ,
.03
11,.21
3..51

k..33
.29
3..19

1. The message states the problem precisely.
Lay versus Scientist
Message type
Interaction
Error

15..21
2..07
22.,k2
295..20

0 .

2. The message contains enough factual evidence to form an opinion
about the problem.
Lay versus Scientist
Message type
Interaction
Error

18..68
6..07
lk,.96
313..20

1
2
2
8k

18..68
3..03
7.,k8
3..73

5..01
0..81
2..01

9.3k

3..02
0..30
0.
.88

3. The message states the problem logically.
Lay versus Scientist
Message type
Interaction
Error

9.3^
1.87
5.^3
260.27

1
2
2
8k

0.93
2.71
3.10

The problem mentioned in the message is complex.
Lay versus Scientist
Message type
Interaction
Error

1..60
1..87
1..87
173..07

1
2
2
8k

.60
1.

0.78

0..93
0..93
2..06

0.^5
0.^5

5. The source of the evidence used in the message is an authority on
the subject of acid rain.
Lay versus Scientist
Message type
Interaction
Error

25.60
5.^9
7-2.7
220.93

1

2
2
8k

25.60
2.7^+

3.63
2.63

9.73*
1.04

1.38

the source of the evidence used in the message

Lay versus Scientist
Message type
Interaction
Error

21.51
5.76
1.16
218.53

1

21.51

2
2
8k

2.88
k.08
2.60

8.27*
1.11
1.57

TABLE 1 (Continued)

Scale

Source

SS
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df

MS

7. Before reading the message, I thought acid rain was a major problem.
Lay versus Scientist
Message type
Interaction
Error

67.60
4.82
1.27
166.93

1
2
2
84

67.60
2.41

1
2
2
84

7.51
3.68
19.21
3.03

0.63

3k.02
1.21
0.31

1.99

message explains the probl em.
Lay versus Scientist
Message type
Interaction
Error

7.51
7.36
38.42
254.67

2.48
1.21
6.34

9. I think the message contains the kind of evidence used in technicaljournal (as opposed to popular magazine) articles.
Lay versus Scientist
Message type
interaction
Error

44.
.10
22.
.69
12..60
.60
205.

1
2
2
84

44,.10
11,
.34
6,.30

18..02
4..64
2..57

2.
.45

10.The problem mentioned in the message is solvable.
Lay versus Scientist
Message type
Interaction
Error

26.18
1.62
3.36
190.4o

1

2
2
84

.68
26.
0..81
1..68
2..27

11.77

0.18
2.10

0.06

0.36
0.74

11.The message states the problem objectively
Lay versus Scientist
Message type
Interaction
Error

0.18
4.20
3.09
264.53

1
2
2
84

1.34
3.15

0.67
0.49

12.The message presents a strong argument for linking increased sulphur
emissions with increased acid rain.
Lay versus Scientist
Message type
Interaction
Error

20.5^
1.42
25.16
283.87

1
2
2
84

20.54
0.71

6.
.08
0.
.21

12.58

3..72

3.38

3k
TABLE 1 (Continued)

Scale

Source

SS

df

MS

F

13«The evidence presented in the message is relevant to the problem.
Lay versus Scientist
Massage type
Interaction
Err or

0.44
0.29
3.76
187.20

1
2

2
8k

o.kk
0.1k
1.89
2.23

0.02
0.16
0.84

Ik.After reading the message, I think acid rain is a major problem.
Lay versus Scientist
Message type
Interaction
Error

O.kk
5.96
W.96
150.27

1
2
2
8k

0.02

O.kk
2.98
•4.98
1.79

1.66
2.78

15.Overall, the message states the problem in a scientific way.
Lay versus Scientist
Message type
Interaction
Error

57.60
5.09

1
2

8.87

2
8k

255.07

57.60
2.54
4.43
3.0k

18.97
0.84
1.46

84.10
3.34
2.10
2.49

33.75
1.34

16.I know the rules for scientific decision -making.
Lay versus Scientist
Message type
Interaction
Error

84.10

6.69
4.20

209.33

1
2

2
8k

0.84

17.The only reason I know these rules is because applying them is
part of my current job.
Lay versus Scientist
Message type
Interaction
Error

1

69.34
1.4o
9.36

2
2

290.80

84

69.34
0.70

20..03

4.68
3.46

0.,20
1..35

18.1 believe in sharing information with people in occupations
different from my own.
Lay versus Scientist
Message type
Interaction
Error

0.47

1
2
2

162.13

84

4.90
1.62

4,.90
0..81

2.54
0.42

0.
.23
1..93

0.12
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TABLE 1 (Continued)

Scale

Source

SS

df

MS

F

19 »Number of favorable words reflecting opinion about the prospect
of solving the problem that the mess*-».c;e describes.
Lay versus Scientist
Message type
Interaction
Error

7..51
0..96
2..32
186..67

1
2
2
84

7..51
0..48
1..41
2,.22

3.• 38
0..22
0..64

20.Ratio of favorable to unfavorable v/ords reflecting opinion about
the prospect of solving the problem that the message describes.
Lay versus Scientist
Message type
Interaction
Error

5..01
2..87
2..62
120,.93

1
2
2
84

5..01
1..44
1..31
1,.44

3..48
1..00
0..91

21.Number of words listed that describe scientific communication.
Lay versus Scientist
Message type
Interaction
Error

p

&C.

48..40
2..02
6..07
800..80

1
2
2
84

48..4o
1 .01
.
3,.03
9..53

5..08
0.,11
0 .32
,
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TABLE 2
Mean Ratings of Lay Versus Scientist of the Three Message Veroiono
on each of the Dependent Measure Scales
n = 15 per cell

Message Versions
Irrelevant
Numbers

Scale

No
Numbers

Relevant
Numbers

3-73
3.87

3.87
3-47

1. The message states the problem precisely.
Lay
Scientist

4.53
2.33

2. The message contains enough factual ovidence to form an opinion
about the problem.
Lay
Scientist

4.40
2. 67

3.kO

4.67

3-60

3»^7

4.47
3*87

3.94
3.87

3.80
6.33

6.13
6.33

3. The message states the problem logically.
Lay
Scientist

4.47
3-20

4. The problem mention in the message is complex.
Lay
Scientist

6.07
5.93

5. The source of the evidence used in the message is an authority on
the subject of acid rain.
Lay
Scientist

4.07
2.20

3.13
2.40

3.67
3*07

6. I trust the source of the evidence used in the message.
Lay
Scientist

4.4-0
2.73

3'60
2.53

3 »73
3-53

7. Before reading the message, I thought acid rain was a major problem.
Lay
Scientist

4.87
6.27

4.07
6.00

4.53
6.40

Critical Difference (Scheff£) = 1.72 for significant interaction.
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TABLE 2 (Continued)

Message Versions
Irrelevant
Numbers

No
Numbers

Relevant
Numbers

4.87 ,
2.4-7

4.07
4.67

4.00
4.07

Scale

8. The message explains the problem.
Lay
Scientist

9. I think the message contains the kind of evidence used in technicaljournal (as opposed to popular magazine) articles.
Lay
Scientist

2.87
I .67

2.93
2.33

4.67
2.27

10.The problem mentioned in the message is solvable.
Lay
Scientist

4.40
6.00

4.67
5.67

5.13
5.80

3.93
3.67

4.0
4.60

11.The message states the problem objectively.
Lay
Scientist

3.93
3.87

12.The message presents a strong argument fgr linking increased sulphur
dioxide emissions with increased acid rain.
Lay
Scientist

5.33
3*27

4.67
3.40

4.07
4.53

13. The evidence presented in the message is relevant to the problem.
Lay
Scientist

5-53
4.80

3.00
5«33

4.87
5.20

k Critical Difference (Scheffe) = 1.60 for significant interaction.
C

Critical Difference (Scheffe) = 1.01 for significant main effect.

^ Critical Difference (Scheffe) = 1.68 for significant interaction.
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TABLE 2 (Continued)

Message Versions
Irrelevant
Numbers

Scale

No
Numbers

Relevant
Numbers

14. After reading the message, I think acid rain is a major problem.
L ay

Scientist

5-57
4.73

5.4-7
6.13

5.60
5.73

15. Overall, the message states the problem in a scientific way.
Lay
Scientist

3.93
2.07

3.53
2.80

4.67
2.47

16. I know the rules for scientific decision-making.
Lay
Scientist

3.67
5» l+ ^

3-13
5*67

4.27
5-80

17. The only reason I know these rules is because applying them is
part of my current job.
Lay
Scientist

2.87
4.13

2.93
4.27

2.47
5.13

18. I believe in sharing information with people in occupations
different from my own.
Lay
Scientist

6.20
6.53

6.13
6.53

5.73
6.40

19. Number of favorable, words reflecting opinion about the prospect
of solving the problem that the message describes.
Lay
Scientist

1.87
O .87

1.87
1.27

1.40
1.27

20. Ratio of favorable to unfavorable words reflecting opinion about
the prospect of solving the problem that the message describes.
Lay
Scientist

1.78
O .83

1.7^
1.44

1.25

1.08

21. Number of words listed that describe scientific communication.
Lay
Scientist

3.60
4.40

3.27

5.33

3.20
4.73
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1. The message explains the
problem precisely.
Lay
Scientist

Irrelevant
Numbers

No
Numbers

Relevant
Numbers

Irrelevant
Numbers

No
Numbers

Relevant
Numbers
12.The message presents a
strong argument for link
ing increased sulphur
dioxide emissions with
increased acid rain.

5H
k-

3-

Lay
Scientist

2-

14
Irrelevant
Numbers

Ro
Numbers

Relevant
Numbers

FIGURE 1
Graphs Showing Significant Interactions between Ratings of the Three
Message Versions by Lay and Scientist Subjects on the Dependent measure
scales
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TABLE 3
Percent of Variance Explained by Significant Differences between Ratings
of the Three Message Versions by Lay and Scientist Subjects on each of
the Dependent Measure Scales

Scale

Source

E2

1. The message states the problem precisely.
Lay versus Scientist
Interaction

.04
.07

2. The message contains enough factual evidence to form an opinion
about the problem.
Lay versus Scientist

.05

5. The source of the evidence used in the message is an authority on
the subject of acid rain.
Lay versus Scientist

.10

6. I trust the source of the evidence used in the message.
Lay versus Scientist

.08

7. Before reading the message, I thought acid rain was a major problem.
Lay versus Scientist

.28

8. The message explains the problem.
Interaction

.12

9. I think the message contains the kind of evidence used in technicaljournal (as opposed to popular magazine) articles.
Lay versus Scientist
Message Type

.15
.003

10.The problem mentioned in the message is solvable.
Lay versus Scientist

.12

12.The message presents a strong argument for linking increased sulphur
dioxide emissions with increased acid rain.
Lay versus Scientist
Interaction

.06
.08

kl
TABLE 3 (Continued)

Scale

Source

E2

15.Overall, the message states the problem in a scientific way.
Lay versus Scientist

.18

16.1 know the rules for scientific decision-making.
Lay versus Scientist

.28

17.The only reason I know these rules is because applying them is part
of ray job.
Lay versus Scientist

.19

21.Number of words listed that describe scientific communication.
Lay versus Scientist

.06

kz
In summary then, the majority of the significant results found
in the analysis of the entire questionnaire are due to differences in
the two populations sampled, with the scientist subjects, in general,
evaluating the message negatively and the lay subjects tending to
have no opinion. As indicated by the disordinal interactions, the
scientist and lay subjects differed particularly in their response to
the irrelevant numbers version of the message. The effects of
quantification in the three message versions (relevant numbers, irrel
evant numbers, and no numbers) were insignificant except for the
technical-journal like evidence question.
Factor Structure of the Questionnaire
A factor analysis was computed for heuristic purposes, to see
what factors tended to emerge out of th? various scales.

The Principal

Components Factor Analysis with Varima>: Orthogonal Rotations was
used.

A four factor solution was obtained.

'As shown in Table 4,

the first factor is best identified by

precision, logicality, and explanation, those variables which loaded
highest on this factor but not at all highly on the other factors.
Other unambiguous variables contributing to this factor included
relevance of evidence and thinking acid rtin was a problem after
reading the message.

We could call this factor Scientific Process

since it seems to pertain to characteristics of scientific inquiry.
Factor two contained the highest loadings for scales measuring
confidence in knowing the rules for scientific decisionmaking, thinking
acid rain was a problem prior to reading the message, and problem
solvability.

Since this factor was loaded on most heavily by knowing

the rules for scientific decisionmaking, we could call it Professional
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Background.
Factor three was loaded on most heavily by authoritativeness of
the message source and by trustworthiness of the message source
(although loadings were somewhat ambiguous on this scale).

Con

sequently, we could describe this factor as pertaining to the
credibility and, in particular, the authoritativeness of the source.
Factor four was loaded on most hsavily by the scales measuring
whether the problem was stated in a scientific way, whether it contained
technical-journal like evidence, and by objectivity.

^hile all

three variables were ambiguous (i.e., unclear differentiation of
primary and secondary loadings), this factor could be described as
pertaining to the message characteristics of the scientific product
or report.
TABLE 4
Simplified Factor Matrix Showing Primary and Secondary Loadings of the
Dependent Measure Scales

Factor

Variable
II

precision
amount evidence
logical
problem complexity
authoritativeness
trustworthiness
prior opinion on acid rain
explanat ion
technical-journal like
problem solvability
objectivity
causality
relevance of evidence

-78
.59
.65

III

IV

• 30
.33

.86
.44

.56

-50

.66
.44

.58

.50
.50
-37

.52

-42

.30

kb
TABLE k (Continued)

Factor

Variable
II

current thoughts about problem .59
scientific problem statement
2
knowing rules
applying rules
sharing information

III

IV

.66
.78
A6
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Qualitative Categories Associated with Scientific Communication
To gain insight into ways scientist and lay subjects characterize
science, subjects were requested to list words illustrative of
differences between scientific and nonscientific communication.
Scientists listed significantly more concepts than did lay subjects.
After data were collected, words or concepts listed by the subjects
were written on blank cards, one word on concept per card.

Frequencies

of words that were mentioned more than once were noted separately but
duplicate words were not included in the deck.
mentioned to the two judges.

Frequencies were not

Two judges familiar with qualitative

methodology were asked to sort the cards independently, clustering
similar qualities into categories and then generating descriptive
labels to describe those qualities.

Jud fo e A initially created six main

categories while Judge B created thirteen.
After this sorting procedure was completed, the researcher collapsed
both judges' categories into a final set of three categories to form maxi
mum convergence between judges (see Appendix C).

As a measure of

^5
correlation between the two judges, Cohen's Coefficient of Agreement
was computed, which indicated a .69 index of reliability.
The first category could be called Process since it pertains to
procedures for scientific decisionmaking and adjudication.

Judge

A described this category as "Truth, objectivity, unbiased and unemo
tional, logical presentation and sense of purpose and importance for
In Judge B's terminology, the category includes "Logical

mankind."

argumentation, rules of inference, objectivity, orderliness and concreteness.

^ithin this category, 128 of the total 191 words listed

were listed by scientists and 63 by lay subjects.

To adjust for the

fact that scientist subjects listed significantly more words, the
ratio of number in the category/total numbers listed for all categories
was computed.

It was seen that scientist subjects included 68

percent of their total words in this c<?te%ory while lay subjects
included *+9. percent.

For both subject populations then, half or more

of the words generated pertained to the idea of science as process.
If category one is Process,

something whose procedures are known

by an "in group," then category two could best be characterized as
Product.

In Judge A's terminology, it is "an outcome referred to by

an 'out group,' which perceives the product of science as confusing,
difficult, and unnecessarily dull." Judge A also noted that such
characteristics lead some to experience a loss of faith in the product
and for others to express belief in a painstaking and methodical
product.

In Judge B's words, this category is characterized by "elitism,

mystification, tedium, paraphenalia, pragmatism, and physical science
terms."

Within this

category, ^9 of the total words were listed by

scientists and 56 by lay subjects.

In terms of percentages, the

scientists included 26 percent of their words in this category whereas
the lay subjects included bk

percent.

The third category was Quantification or Measurement.

although

the category was a fairly small one, it does seem to have several
distinguishing characteristics.

The words listed in this category—

words like "statistics," "numbers," and "numerical" and "quantitative"
—were more frequently mentioned by subjects than words in the other
two categories.

Within

lay subjects included 9»

this category scientists included 12 words and
-^or both subjects 6 percent of their total

words were included in this category.

CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The review of the literature in Chapter 1 showed that quantif
ication was a norm for scientific communication and that it affected
attitude change and perceived problem solvability for lay subjects.
Whether these results could be generalized to scientists as well as to
lay subjects had not been studied in the prior research.

Nor was it

clear whether previous results were due to the mere presence of
numbers or to the specificity of the evidence and arguments presented.
Finally, the literature review showed that there was a derth of
information on ways in which scientist and lay subjects conceptualize
or think about science.
To clarify these questions, five hypotheses were advanced.
This chapter discusses the tests of the hypotheses as well as their
implications.
Tests of Hypotheses
The first hypothesis stated,
Scientist and lay subjects will perceive messages with
numbers as having greater scientificity than messages
without numbers.
The results of the analysis of variance showed that, except for the
questionnaire item that asked if the message contained technicaljournal like evidence (Item 9)1 the null hypothesis regarding the rela
tionship between message version and message evaluation could not be
rejected.

'^he main effect for the technical-journal question revealed

that the relevant numbers message version was evaluated significantly

k7
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higher than the other two versions.

The only other significant

differences involving message type were significant disordinal inter
actions for the scaled items about precision (Item l), whether the
message explained the problem (Item 8), and whether it established a
causal link (Item 12).

These interactions were attributable

to the

scientists' disdain for the irrelevant numbers message.
Although significant differences between the message types were
found on only a few scales, the scales intended to measure perceived
scientificity did intercorrelate highly with each other and very lowly
\

with the other scale items.
The second hypothesis stated,
Message version will affect lay and scientist subjects'
predisposition favorable to finding solution.
The results of the analysis of variance showed that the null hypothesis
pertaining to the relationship between problem solvability and quanti
fication in messages could not be rejected.

Of the dependent measures

pertinent to this hypothesis, the only significant differences were
between scientist and lay subjects, with the scientists agreeing
significantly more that acid rain was a problem (Item ?) and that
it was a solvable problem (Item 10).

Perceived complexity (Item 4)

was not, however, evaluated differently by the two populations.

All

significant differences were due to tie populations sampled, not to
the messages.

However, whether scientists would hold the same

opinion about problems other than acid riin is not clear.
The present study did not replicate the Witt study.

Failure to

replicate Witt's study could be due to variance in the present study

*+9
added by using a non-neutral topic.

However, it could be argued that

the low intercorrelation between prior opinion on whether acid rain
was a problem and all other scales indicates that prior opinion was
not an' important factor in the results.

Failure to replicate could also

be due to differences in instructional set.

Si nce Witt's article

failed to include the instructions to subjects that accompanied his
list of words, it it possible that the present study suggested a
different instructional set for responses to the word list.
Hypothesis three stated,
Subjects' perceptions of the authoritativeness of the
message source will be affected by the presence or absence
of numbers in the messages but their perceptions of the
trustworthiness of the message source will not be so
affected.
Results of the analysis of variance indicate that the null hypothesis
cannot be rejected.

Again, message version had no effect on subject

perceptions of trustworthiness (Item 6) and authoritativeness (Item 5)However, there were significant differences between lay and scientist
subjects on the two scaled items, with scientists tending to distrust
and doubt the authoritativeness of the message source.
However, given that McCroskey's studies (19&6, 1967* 1970)
indicated that it was authoritativeness that was most affected by evidence,
it is interesting to note that on the factor analysis, it was the
authoritativeness variable which most strongly characterized the
third factor, Credibility.
Hypothesis four stated,
Scientist subjects will have stronger opinions about science
than will lay subjects.
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Results of the analysis of variance indicated that the null hypothesis
could, in this case, be rejected.

Scientist subjects were, not

surprisingly, significantly more confident of their knowledge than lay
subjects (Item 16).

The comparatively low intercorrelations between

the knowing-the-rules and only-knowing-them-because-it-is-part-of-myjob (Item 1?) scales could be taken to indicate that the scientist's
confidence in their knowledge of rules for science does not come
from their jobs, but rather that it coiaP3 from their disciplines.
Scientists also generated significantly more words than did lay subjects
to illustrate differences between scientific and nonscientific
communication.
Hypothesis five stated,
Scientist subjects will be less willing to disseminate infor
mation than will lay subjects.
Results of the analysis of variance indicate that the null hypothesis
cannot be rejected.

N 0 significant differences between scientist and

lay subjects were found on the scaled question about willingness to
share information (Item l8).
This is puzzling since the literature indicates that the closed
communication system of the discipline is crucial to the doing of
contemporary science.

In conjunction, another surprising result of

the qualitative section of the present study was that few of the
concepts generated by the scientists pertained to what Judge B called
"Community of colleagues" and Judge k referred to as the "in group."
A possibility is that the lack of results in this area is due to an
the scaled item's having tapped a cultural truism. Or that the insignifi
cant result is due to a population artifact.

One of the researcher's
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collaborators in gathering data, for example, is the Central Region
Coordinator for the -Environmental Impact Analysis Office of the U.S.
Geological Survey.

Certainly, in impact analysis, there is a kind

Df imperative for interdisciplinary communication.

An alternative

explanation, of course is that the scaled opinion question does not
measure the subtlety of the disciplinary control of information.
Implications
In this section implications of the tests of hypotheses will be
considered in conjunction with the results of the qualitative inquiry.
Before preceding, it would be useful to reiterate some of the major
conclusions that can be drawn from Chanter l's discussion of different
ideas of science.

First, there are many ideas and no consensus as

to what science consists of.

Second, a fairly common view, for both

scientist and presumably lay subjects, is the logical-empiricist
view of science or some version of it, which emphasizes the truth
and validity of scientific knowledge.

Third, virtually nothing is

known about how lay subjects characterize or conceptualize science.
Before discussion of the specific qualities which subjects asso
ciated with science, it is interesting to note that while the researcher
asked for words and phrases illustrating differences between scientific
and nonscientific communication, what she got?'back

((3%

for scientist

and ^9 % for lay sub jects) were words and phrases illustrative of
the process of doinp; science.

Perhaps the subjects, particularly the

scientists, regarded scientific communication as more substantive,
an integral part of the doing of science.
Returning to the vocabulary of the first chapter, the first major
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category found among the subjects' lists of words about science was
•Process, which could also be referred to as

b tory:

words within this

category are illustrative of ideas about what constitutes a good
science story.

1 'he

second major category, Product, could be referred

to as Message: words within this category are illustrative of ideas
about what makes a message or report scientific.
Keeping these distinctions in mind, it is interesting to note
that scientists listed more words representative of the Story or
Process category, and lay subjects listed more words in the Product
or Message category.

Th.us, we could take the Story category as

exemplifying how the scientists conceptualized science and the Message
category as exemplifying how the lay subjects conceptualized science.
After discussion of some of the pertinent characteristics of
the categories in conjunction with the literature review presented
earlier, this section will examine ways in which credibility seems to
be operating for both categories, and, finally, discuss the nature
of the relationship between these two mammoth categories and the tiny
but clear-cut Quantification category.
Process and Story
In chapter one, it was noted that scientific knowledge is no
longer regarded as having deductive certainty. In overwhelming numbers,
both lay and scientist subjects listed words that reflect the idea
that scientific knowledge is certain.

In the words of one respondent:

science is "accurate, true, and right;" in the words of another,
"science ain't fuzzy."

While there were a few scientists who listed

words like "qualitative" and "inductive" and "attenpted objectivity",
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they were in the minority.

For the subjects in this study, science

is more than a useful problem-solving model: it leads to Truth.
It is interesting to note that "elitist," "pretentious," and
"insensitive" were the most pejorative words that lay subjects listed.
At no time did they seem to be questioning the "accurate, true, and
right" idea of science.

As

will be shown in the discussion of the

second category, Product or Message, lay subjects seem more bemused
than anything else about science.
Another interesting characteristic of the Process category is
the prevalence of terms pertaining to reasoning and rules for inference
and argumentation over terms pertaining to empiricism, observation, and
data.

This is particularly interesting since Geology and Engineering,

the disciplines from which the scientist-subjects were drawn,
are "hard" sciences.

For the scientists, very few respondents listed

terms like "exhausting" (i.e., conducting research is exhausting).
lack of personal responses perhaps indicates that scientists

This

re trained

to think about science in the generalised terms of the hypothetico-deductive model of science, not in terms of their own personal experience
with the complicated process of data gathering.
Product and Message
This category, which contained the greatest percentage of lay
words, focused on nonsubstantive aspects of the message. As was
mentioned previously, little to nothing has been done to investigate
how lay people respond to science, beyond to say that some lay
people have faith in science and others do not.

It is interesting

5b
to note that lay subjects seemed clearly overwhelmed and confused
by "big words," "Latin words," "science words," "large words,""vo
cabulary," "wordy,"

and "detail."

The effect of the seemingly alien

vocabulary—as well as "more sources," "footnotes," "figures,"
"diagrams," "charts, 1 . 1

"graphs,"

both a sense of efficacy

"symbols," and "dates"—was to produce

for humankind as well as mystification and

tedium.
It' is interesting to note that, on the factor analysis, two
variables, objectivity and stating the problem in a scientific way,
were ambiguous in the factor loadings bet-een what we are now calling
the Story and Message categories.-

Thus, it would seem that both the

message format and the story form somehow affect credibility. Tt
is then both belief in the method of science and the methodical
empirical writing and technical-journal publication style that
inspires faith. Interestingly, authoritativeness intercorrelated
most highly with the causality and stating-it-in-a-scientific-way
scales, whereas trustworthiness intercorrelated most highly with the
evidence-like-a-technical-journal and stating-it-in-a-scientific-way
scales.
Quantification: a Message or a Story Variable?
Examining the results of the analyses of variance, the factor
analysis, and the qualitative sorting en masse raises the following
question: Is quantification most closely associated with the -Product
(Message) or the Process (Story) categories derived in the qualitative
sorting and the factor analysis?

Although differences between scientist

and lay subjects for the irrelevant nuirbers version of the message were
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not significant on all scales, examination,
indicates a similar pattern for all

nin^

scientific qualities of the messages.
the irrelevant numbers version.

of the means table
of the scales measuring

Scientists • reacted negatively to

An example of this is one scientist's

objection to the irrelevant numbers message version,
by comments like "what next?

as

illustrated

rainas acidic as ice cream?".

The

lay subjects, however, reacted about the same as they did to the
relevant numbers version of the message.
The scientists' negative response to the irrelevant numbers
version could be interpreted as indicating that scientists regard
quantification as part of their domain, that it is part of the
process of doing science.

When quantification is used appropriately

it may not necessarily be rewarded, but it most certainly will not
trigger a negative evaluation.

Quantification then, at least

for scientists, seems a story component.
For

lay subjects, however, quantification seems to reside more

in the product or message category.

Lay subjects usually responded

equivalently to the irrelevant and

rlevant

message versions.

-^urther, the difference between respont.es to the irrelevant numbers
version by lay and scientist subjects could

be taken to indicate that,

not knowing the underlying rules for science, the lay subjects do not
see the violation of the rule.

In the one case where lay subjects

were significantly more favorable to the relevant numbers version, it could
be argued that they were influenced by the presence of measurement
terms like "tonnes/year."

This seems possible since the paraphenalia of

technical communication—words, symbols, diagrams, etc.—figures so
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heavily in the Product category and since the one significant scale
for main effect most represented the Product factor on the factor
matrix (factor four).
In summary then, the role of quantification seems a complex one.
Quantification seems to play a different role for scientist and lay
subjects. The

present study has extended the previous literature

by l) showing that quantification functions differently for lay
and scientist subjects; 2^ that scientist and lay subjects tend to
conceptualize science differently; and J>) that for both groups,
science is regarded as "accurate, true, and right."

Appendix A
Survey Instrument
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June 30* 1980

As part of my M.A. thesis at the University of Montana, I am studying
variables

some

rel&"ted to written communication. To answer my research questions,

I have condensed a 200-word message

on acid rain from previous studies.

Since the messages in previous studies were rated by a diversified group
of people, I, too, need a diversified group to rate my 200-word message.
All I nsed you to do is to read the attached message and then rate it
by answering the questions that folio 1 *.

There are no "right" or "wrong"

answers. I am particularly interested in your acting as a critic for me,
in your telling me whether the quantity and quality of the evidence
included in the message is sufficient.

I would greatly appreciate your help (this will not take any more than
10 minutes of your time).

Please do not discuss your responses with

anyone until you have finished the task.
will be anonymous—by mid July-

I need your response—which

Again, thank you for the help!
Sincerely,

Claudia Krenz
Department of Interpersonal
Communication
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•PLEASE READ TIIE FOLLOWING MESSAGE CAREFULLY*

MESSAGE

For the world's inhabitants, particularly those around the Atlantic
Ocean, acid rain has been labeled a major environmental problem associated
with fossil fuel combustion.

Although fuels derived from coal add 1.2

to 2.8 times more carbon/unit than conventional fossil fuels, it is overall
fossil-fuel use that is problematic.

Human activities are adding sulphur

dioxide to the atmosphere and thereby increasing rain's acidity (indicated
by lower scale positions) beyond its norm of 5«7»
Until mid century, European sulphur dioxide emissions were fairly
constant (about 25 million tonnes).
3-fold to about 70 million tonnes.

In the past decade, they have increased
Canada's current emissions are now

about the same as Britain's (about 5 million tonnes), but the United
States' are about 5 times that.
Last decade, on an uneventful spring day, rain in a storm over Scotland
was as acidic as vinegar (2.4), the worst recording ever.

In the eastern

United States, rainfall's average acidity (now between 4.0 and 4.5) has
dramatically increased since mid century-

Some rainfall now is as acidic

as lemon juice, over 100 times above normal.

Already, acid rain has been

recorded in the following areas: Los A n g e les, San Francisco, Seattle, and
the Rocky Mountains.
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*PLEASE READ THE FOLLt WING MESSAGE CAREFULLY*

MESSAGE

For the world's inhabitants, particularly those living on both sides
of the Atlantic Ocean, acid rain has been labeled as a very serious
global environmental problem that is associated with fossil fuel combus
tion.

Although synthetic gas and synthetic oil derived from coal add

more carbon/unit to the atmosphere than do conventional fossil fuels,
it is the overall use of all fossil fuels that is problematic.

Human

activities are adding to the sulphur dioxide in the atmosphere and
thereby increasing the acidity of rain.
Until mid century, sulphur dioxide emission rates in Europe were
fairly constant.
matically.

In the past decade, these rates have increased dra

Canada's current emission rates are now about the same

as Britain's, but the U n ited States' are much higher, although not so
high as those in Europe.
Last decade, on an otherwise normal, uneventful spring day, the rain
in a storm over Scotland was as acidic as vinegar, the worst recording
ever made.

In the eastern United States, the average rainfall has become

dramatically more acidic since mid century.
acidic as lemon juice.

Some rainfall now is as

Already, acid rain has been recorded in the

following areas: Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, and the Rocky
Mountains.
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*PLEASE READ THE FOLLCJIIIG MESSAGE CAREFULLY *

MESSAGE

For the world's 3 billion inhabitants, particularly for those on
the 2 sides of the Atlantic Ocean, acid rain has been labeled as 1 of
6 major environmental problems associated with fossil-fuel combustion.
Although fuels derived from coal add more carbon/unit than do conven
tional fossil fuels, it is the cumulative effect of 100% of all use
that is problematic.

Human activities are

adding to the sulphur

dioxide in the atmosphere and thereby increasing the acidity of rain.
Until the first 30 years of this century had passed, Europe's sulphur
dioxide emissions were fairly constant.
they have increased dramatically.

In the past decade or 10 years,

Canada's annual emission rates are

now similar to Britain's, but the United States' are much higher.
although not so high as Europe's.
About 10 years ago, on an otherwise uneventful April 10th, rain in
a storm over Scotland was as acidic as vinegar, the worst recording
ever.

In the eastern 1/2 of the United States, the average rainfall has

become dramatically more acidic since the 1950s.
is as acidic as lemon juice.

Some rainfall now

Already, acid rain has been recorded in

the 4 following are a s: Los Angeles, ^an Francisco, Seattle, and the
Rocky Mountains.
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QUESTIONNAIRE

After reading the message, please indicate your opinion about the questions
and statements that follow. There are no "right" and "wrong" answers
I am interested in your first opinion (your initial assessment) so please
do not refer back to the message .
*

*

*

*

*

PLEASE UNDERLINE EACH WORD "THAT REFLECTS YOUR OPINION ABOUT THE PROSPECT
OF SOLVING THE PROBLEM THAT"THE MESSAGE DESCRIBES.
impossible
blue
unquestionable
successful
difficult
fast
accessible
unimaginable
unreasonable
certain

low
below
unfavorable
precise
inconceivable
attainable
red
unambiguous
likely
improbable

impractical
workable
bad
available
green
inexact
unfeasible
small
unachievable
negative

PLEASE ACT AS A CRITIC BY RATING THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS (MOSTLY ABOUT
THE KIND OF EVIDENCE INCLUDED IN THE MESSAGE). PLEASE RESPOND TO EACH
STATEMENT INDIVIDUALLY AND INDICATE YOUR OPINION BY CIRCLING THE APPROPRIATE
SCALE POSITION. The scales are ordered as follows:

disagree
strongly

1.

disagreesomewhat

-L
disagree
slightly

no
opinion

agree
slightly

agree
somewhat

_Z

agree
strongly

The message states the problem precisely.
12

3

4

5

6

7

2. The message contains enough factual evidence to form an opinion about
the problem.
12
3.

4

5

6

7

6

7

The message states the problem logically.
1

4.

5

2

3

4

5

The problem mentioned in the message is complex.
1

2

5

4

5

6

7

5. The source of the evidence used in the message is an authority on the
subject of acid rain.
12
6.

3

4

5

6

7

I trust the source of the evidence used in the message.
I

2

5

4

5

6

7

(continued next page)
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7*

Before reading the message, I thought acid rain was a major problem.
1

8.

2

3

4

5

6

7

5

6

7

The message explains the problem.
i

2

3

4

9. I think the message contains the kind cf evidence used in technicaljournal (as opposed to popular magazine) articles.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

10. The problem mentioned in the message is solvable.
12

3

4

5

6

7

11. The message states the problem objectively.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

12. The message presents a strong argument for linking increased sulphur
dioxide emissions with increased acid rain.
1

2

5

4

5

6

7

13. The evidence presented in the message is relevant to the problem.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

14. After reading the message, I think acid rain is a major problem.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

15. Overall, the message states the problem in a scientific way.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

16. I know the rules for scientific decision-making.
1

2

5

4

5

6

7

17- The only reason I know these rules is because applying them is part
of my current job.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

l8. I believe in sharing information with people in occupations different
from my own.
1

2

5

4

5

6

7

(continued next page)

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

6 4

OFF THE TOP OF YOUR HEAD, LIST \S MANY WORDS AS YCU CAII TIIAT IILUSTRATE
WAYS IN WHICH SCIENTIFIC COMMUNICATION IS DIFFERENT FROM NGrsCIZIiTIFIC
COMMUNICATION.

PLEASE RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS BY FILLING IN THE BLANKS.
My occupation is

.

My main job activity (management, teaching,clerical,research, etc.) is
•

My highest academic degree (if any) is

.

Date conferred:

.

Discipline or subject:

.

If currently a student, circle

class: freshman

and list major:

sophomore

junior

senior

.

Have you ever personally conducted research or a literature review on
acid rain?

Appendix B

Demographic Information
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TABLE 1

Demographic Information about Scientist Subjects Receiving the Irrele-r
ant Numbers Version of the Message

Dis
cipline

Degrees and Pates they were
Received

Engineering ]B-x(6l)

Geology

Chemistry

Main Job Activities^
Project Engineer

M-x(75)

Management

D-x(W

Administration

jB-x(47)x(70)x(nd)

Research (3)

M-x(72)x(74)x(75)x(78)

Research (3)

D-x(56)X(71)X(74)

Research (3)

(B-x(67)

Nuclear W a ste Management

D

Biology

3- X(78)

Environmental Education

D

a

B = Bachelors degree; M = Masters degree; D = Doctoral degree,

k Parenthesized number indicates frequency of response.
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TABLE 2
Demographic Information about Scientist Subjects Receiving the No
Numbers Version of the Message

Dis
cipline
Engineering

Degrees and Dates they were
Received a

Main Job Activitie;

B-X(56)X(65)X(67)X(75)X(78)X(8O)

Management (2); project
engineer; electrical engineer; mechanical systems
design; research.

M- x (47)x(80)

Management

D

Geology

Physics

B-x(55)

Data Collection

M-x(49)

Research

D-X(37)X(44)X(72)X(75)

Research (2); adminis
tration (2)

B

M-x(68)

Management

D

aB

= Bachelors degree; M = Masters degree; D = Doctoral degree.

^Parenthesized numbers indicates frequency of response.
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TABLE Z
Demographic Information about Scientist Subjects Receiving the Relevant
Numbers Version of the Message

Dis
cipline
Engineering

Degrees and Dates they were
Received

Main Job Activities

B-X(39)X(58)X(6I)X(74)X(8O)JC(8O)

Management (3); project
management, site engin
eer; research

M- X(62)X(65)

Design; management

D

Geology

a

B-x (4l)x(46)

Map compilation; research

M >-x(5l)x (56)

EIS preparation; research

D-x(37)x(?4)x(77)

Research (2); research and
management

B = Bachelors degree; M = Masters degree; D = Doctoral degree.

^ Parenthesized numbers indicates frequency of response.

Appendix C

APPENDIX C
Words Generated by Subjects on which Judges
Agreed after Collapsing Categories

Judge
Judge A
Underlying
Sense of
Efficacy

Outcome

Loss of
Faith

Word Source
Scientist Lay

Judge B
Depth k
Depth &
Depth
Depth
Elitism

Breadth
Breadth
Breadth
Breadth

1
1
1
1
1

Mystification
Mystification
Mystification
Tedium
Paraphenalia
Paraphenalia
Breadth & Depth

5
1
1

Paraphenalia
Paraphenalia
Paraphenalia
Paraphenalia
Paraphenalia
Paraphenalia
Paraphenalia
Pragmatism
Pragmatism
Depth & Breadth
Depth & Breadth

1
1
1

7
1
1
1
1

1

k

1
1
1
2

1

1
b

1
1
2

Word

Final Category

far reaching
goals
informative
understanding
knowledge

Product

technical
verbosity
wordy
time
vocabulary
science terms
depth
name dropping to spread out the blame
literature background
author stated with credentials
more sources
references
footnotes
sources
pragmatism
interest
involved
detail

APPENDIX £ (Continued)

Judge A

Word Source
Scientist Lay

Word

1
1
1
1
1

laborious
educated •
peer review
peers
exhausting

Judge
Judge B
Tedium
Elitism
Comm. Colleagues
Comm. Colleagues
Depth & Breadth

Vaguely Per
ceived
Distinguish
ing Modes of
of Pre
sentation

Confusing,
Difficult,
Unnecessar
ily Dull

Paraphenalia
Paraphenalia
Paraphenalia
Paraphenalia
Paraphenalia
Paraphenalia
Paraphenalia
Paraphenalia
Physical Sci.
Physical Sci.
Physical Sci.
Physical Sci.
Physical Sci.
Mystification
Mystification
Mystification
Mystification
Mystif ication
Mystification
Mystification
Mystification

1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Ter,
Ter,•
Ter,
Ter,i
Ter.
»

»

2
1
1
1
1
1
i
2

1
1
1

3
1
2
1

figures
diagrams
charts
dates
abbreviations
symbols
symbols like pH
graphs
DNA
chemical compounds
biological
sodium potassium
nitrate
difficult vocabulary
confusing
complex
complicated
ambiguous
bad syntax
v .,ig words
longer explanations

Final Category

APPENDIX C (Continued)

Judge
Judge A

Judge B
Tedium
Mystification
Mystification
Tedium
Tedium
Elitism
Elitism
Elitism
Comm. Colleagues
Tedium
Elitism
Paraphenalia
Mystification
Mystification
Mystification
Mystification
Mystification

Process,
in group

Word Source
Scientist Lay
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1
1
1
1

5

Objectivity
1
Objectivity
2
Objectivity
3
Objectivity
1
Objectivity
1
Objectivity
8
Objectivity
1
Objectivity
Logical Argumen. .1
Logical rirgunen. 1

1
1
1
3
1
1

2

5
1
2

Word

Final Category

dull
long, fact filled sentences
formal language
boring
dry
educated guess
elitist
erudite
geared toward a specific group
insensitive
pretentious
language
Latin words
large words
jargon
not clear
technical jargon
careful attribution
definitions
orderly
organization
data basis
data
structured
systematically classify
correlations
evaluation

Process

APFENDIX C (Continued)

Judge
Judge A

Judge B
Logical
Logical
Logical
Logical
Logical
Logical
Logical
Logical
Logical
Logical
L ogical
Logical
Logical
Logical
Logical
Logical
Logical
Logical
Logical
Logical
Logical
Logical
Logical
Logical
Logical
Logical
Logical

Word Source
Scientist Lay
Argumen. 1
Argumen. 1
Argumen. 2
Argumen. 2
Argumen. 1
Argumen. 2
A rgumen.
Argumen. 1
Argumen. 1
Argumen. 1
Argumen. 1
Argumen. 1
Argumen. 2
Argumen. 1
Argumen. 1
Argumen. 1
.Argumen.
Argumen. 1
Argumen. 1
Argumen. 1
Argumen. 1
Argumen.
Argumen. 2
Argumen. 3
Argumen. 2
Argumen. 1
Argumen. 2

1
1

1

1

1
2
2

Word
explanation
interpretation
probability
problem statement
scientific method
experiment
control
cites all evidence
alternative hypotheses
evidence
experimental basis
experimental evidence
hypotheses
inductive
monitor
multiple hypotheses
nomological-deductive
observation
observed effects
presents all evidence
variables
repeatable
research
tested
analysis
consideration
study

Final Category

APPENDIX C (Continued)

Judge
Judge A

Judge B

Objective
Truth, Un
biased &
Unemotional

Logical Argumen.
Logical Argumen.
Objectivity
Objectivity
Objectivity
Objectivity
Objectivity
Objectivity
Objectivity
Objectivity
Objectivity
Objectivity
Ob jectivity
Objectivity
Objectivity
Objectivity
Objectivity
Objectivity
Objectivity
Objectivity
Objectivity

Sense of
Accuracy

Objectivity
Objectivity
Objectivity
Ob iectivity
Objectivity
Objectivity

Word Source
Scientist Lay
1

3
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

6
1

10
1
1
1
1
1

Word

Final Category

conclusions based on weighing factual evidence
documented
objectivity
objective use of objectively obtained data
nonbiased
avoids polemics
appeals to objectivity
attempted objectivity
one meaning agreed upon by all
even handed treatment of data
impartial
unbiased
dispassionate
non opinionated
attempted factuality
unopinionated
non partisan
non personal
nonfeeling
unemotional
impersonal
factual
valid
verifiable
unquestionable
true
right

APPENDIX C (Continued)

Judge
Judge A

Judge B
Objectivity
Objectivity
Objectivity
Logical Argumen.
Logical ^rgumen.
Logical Argumen.

Logical or
Logical-like
Presentation

'Jriting that
Used Numbers

V/ord Source
Scientist Lay
1
1
k
1

Logical Argumen. 10
Logical Argumen. 1
Orderliness
Orderliness
1
Objectivity
1
Objectivity
1
Concreteness
1
Concreteness
1
Concreteness
8
Concreteness
Concreteness
l
Concreteness
Concreteness
Concreteness
3
Quantification
Quantification
Quantification
Quantification
Quantification
'Quantification
Quantification
Quantification

1
1
1
1
2
2
if

2
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
7
1
2
1
2
2
1

k

V/ord

Final Category

provable
authentic
accurate
positive proof
proof
reliable
logic
appeals to logic
logical organization
organized factual presentation
empiricism
descriptive
concrete
direct
lucid
precise
rigor
unambiguous
clarity
concise
numerical
numbers
mathematics
more quantitative data
statistical base
statistics
statistically meaningful
quantitative

Quantification
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